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ABSTRACT.  During  September  1983  an  unusually  early  freeze-up and persistent  northwesterly  winds  that  drove  heavy  multi-year  ice  into  Proliv 
Longa  and  against  the  north  coast  of  Chukotka resulted in a  critical  situation  with  regard  to  shipping  in  the  Soviet  eastern  Arctic.  Ports  such as 
Zelenyy  Mys and Mys  Shmidta  were  prematurely  closed by ice, leaving  Pevek as the  only  functioning  port  in  this part of  the  Arctic. Worse still, 
dozens  of ships were  beset  in  the  ice  at  various  points  from  the  mouth  of  the  Indigirka  east  to Bering Strait.  One  freighter, Nina Sagaydak, was 
crushed and sank near Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov on 8  October;  a  sister  ship, Kolya Myagotin, was  badly  holed and barely  managed  to  limp  out  of  the  Arc- 
tic.  Practically  all  available  ice  breakers,  including  the  nuclear-powered  icebreakers L nin, Leonid Brezhnev and Sibir’, were  transferred  from  the 
western  to  the  eastern  Arctic  to  free  the  jammed  ships.  Ultimately  all  were rescued, but  it  was late November  before  the  last  ship  sailed  from  Pevek. 
Many ships  were  forced  to  head  west  from  Pevek to the  Atlantic,  rather  than  attempt  to  battle  their way through  the  heavy  ice  in  Proliv  Longa  in  order 
to return  to  their  Pacific  home ports. Singled  out  for particular praise  in  Soviet  post-mortems  of  the  crisis  were  the  nuclear-powered  icebreakers  and 
the  new Noril’sk class  (SA-15)  icebreaking  freighters,  several  of  which came straight  from  the  Finnish  shipyards  to  help  rectify  the  situation  in  the 
eastern  Arctic. 
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&UM& En septembre  1983,  un  gel  plus  t6t  que  d’ordinaire  et  des  vents  persistants  du  nord-ouest  qui pousdrent de  la  vieille  glace misse dans la 
Proliv  Longa  et contre  la  c8te nord de Chukotka crerent une  situation  critique  quant h la  navigation dans l’est de l’Arctique  soviettique. Des ports tels 
Zelenyy  Mys  et  Mys  Shmidta  furent  fermes  pr6matur6ment  par  la glace,ne laissant  que  Pevek  comme seul port  ouvert dans cette  partie  de  l’Arctique. 
Des douzaines de  navires  furent  pris  dans  la  glace B divers  endroits  entre  l’embouchure  de I’Indigirka  et le dQroit de Bering B l’est. Un navire  de 
charge, le Nina Sagaydak, fut &ras? et  coula pds  de Kosa Dvukh Pilotov le 8  octobre; son navire jumeau,  le Kolya Myagotin, fut  gravement  perce  et 
ne reussit  que  de  peu h se traîner  hors de l’Arctique.  Presque  tous  les  brise-glaces, y compris  les  brise-glaces B propulsion  nucleaire  le Lenin, le 
Leonid  Brezhnev et  le Sibir ’ furent  transfer&  de l’ouest B l’est  de  l’Arctique  afin  de  liberer les vaisseaux pris dans les  glaces.  Tous furent S~COUNS 
&entuellement  mais  le  dernier  navire  ne  quitta  Pevek  qu’h  la  fin-novembre.  Plusieurs d’entre eux  durent  naviguer  vers  l’ouest h partir  de  Pevek, en 
direction  de  l’Atlantique,  plut&  que  de  tenter  de s  frayer un passage h travers I’epaisse glace dans la  Proliv  Longa  afin de  retourner B leurs  ports 
d’attache dans la  Pacifique. Les brise-glaces h propulsion  nucl6aire  et les nouveaux  navires  de  charge  de  categorie Nori1  ’sk (SA-  15)  furent IouangC 
dans les analyses  substquentes;  plusieurs  de  ces  navires  vinrent  directement  des  chantiers  navals en  Fin ande  pour  aider B rectifier  la  situation dans 
l’est  de  l’Arctique  sovietique. 
Mots cl&:  l’est de l’Arctique  sovietique,  l’Union  SoviQique,  navigation,  brise-glaces 
Traduit  pour  le  journal par Maurice  Guibord. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the earliest years of the Soviet regime, but especially 
since  1934,  the  Soviet  government  has  placed  heavy  emphasis 
on  the  importance  of  developing  the  Northern Sea Route  as  a 
commercial  shipping  route.  The  progress  toward  this  end  has 
been comprehensively summarized and analyzed by Arm- 
strong (1952, 1980). The achievements attained during this 
half  century  are  truly  impressive. In the  western  sector  of  the 
Arctic  the  navigation  season  has  been  extended  to  a  full  twelve 
months. Thus, for example, shipments of nickel ore (from 
Noril’sk)  moving  west  from  the  port of  Dudinka  on  the  Yen- 
isey  to  Murmansk are interrupted  only  for  a  few  weeks  during 
the month of June, and even this is due to the annual flood 
associated  with  break-up  on  the  Yenisey  rather  than  with  ice 
conditions at sea. The stated long-range goal is to achieve 
year-round navigation along the entire Northern Sea Route 
(Armstrong, 1984). 
The  Soviet  Union  has  accumulated  an  extremely  impressive 
fleet of icebreakers  and  ice-strengthened  freighters for opera- 
tion  in arctic  waters.  It  includes  at  least 14 polar  icebreakers, 
three of  which (Lenin, Leonid  Brezhnev and Sibir’) are 
nuclear-powered; a fourth nuclear-powered icebreaker, Ros- 
siyu, is  now  fitting  out  and  should go  into  service  in  the  near 
future. Among  the  ice-strengthened  freighters  the  most  recent 
and  most  impressive  additions  to  the fleet are the 14 ships of 
the Noril’sk or SA-15  class;  these are vessels of 19 500  tonnes 
dead weight. With this powerful fleet of ships and with a 
sophisticated support system involving weather stations, ice 
reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, until the summer of 
1983  it  appeared  that  the  aim  of  year-round  navigation  along 
the  entire  Northern Sea Route  was  neither  unrealistic  nor  unat- 
tainable. 
But  as  the  season  unfolded  reports  of  very  severe  ice  condi- 
tions in Proliv Longa, between Ostrov Vrangelya and the 
mainland  (Fig. l),  of large numbers  of  ships  being  jammed in 
the  ice,  and  finally  of  a  ship  being  crushed  and  sunk  provided 
the  evidence  that  despite  the  sophistication of the  icebreakers 
and  support  systems  arrayed  against it, the  arctic  ice  could  still 
disrupt  shipping  severely. 
The  crisis  and  the  means  taken  to  tackle  it  were  very  widely 
reported  in  the  Soviet  press,  and  this  account  of  the  crisis  is 
based  almost  entirely  on  those  reports.  The  subject  was  hand- 
led  in  most  Soviet  newspapers  as  a  demonstration  of  the  skill, 
heroism  and  devotion  to  duty  of  Soviet  seamen  and  scientists 
in  avoiding  what  might  clearly  have  become  a  much  more  ser- 
ious  disaster.  The  fact  that no lives were lost and that there 
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FIG. I .  Chukotka,  showing the main  locations associated with the 1983 shipping crisis. 
were  no  serious  injuries i  indeed  a  tribute  to  the  efficiency  and 
skill of those  involved  in  the  rescue  operations.  After  the  event 
a series of “post-mortems” appeared in the Soviet press, 
wherein  blame  was  allocated  with  considerable  candour. 
It must be recognized  that  the  Soviet  media’s  information 
should  be  treated  with  some  caution  in  terms  of  its  reliability. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  sources  used  in  compiling  this  ac- 
count  include  six  separate  newspapers,  all of  which  varied  in 
minor  details but  agreed  on  major  points,  would  suggest  the 
picture presented here is reasonably accurate. And certainly 
the  Landsat  image  of  icebreaker  tracks  off  Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov 
(Fig. 16) provides incontestable confirmation of the Soviet 
press  accounts of the  rescue  of  ships  from  that  location  within 
the  previous  few  days. 
THE SETTING 
The  1983  season  appeared  to  start  fairly  normally.  Thus,  for 
example,  the  freighter Nizhneyunsk (Fig. 2), the  first  freighter 
to  call  at  the  port of Pevek in 1983,  arrived  there on 24 June. 
Similarly  the  first  convoy  reached  Mys  Shmidta  on thè usual 
date, 11  June (Martyshin,  1983d), but  significantly  the 
freighters  were  able  to  get  alongside  to  unload  only  two  weeks 
later  due  to  ice.  Later  in  the  season,  however,  things  were  far 
from normal; from early August onward, ice concentrations 
were substantially heavier than usual, especially in Proliv 
Longa. The situation appears to have arisen from a severe 
early  drop in temperatures;  thus,  for  example, new  ice  began 
to  form  some  two  weeks  earlier  than  usual  along  the  whole of
the Chukotka coast (Vodnyy Transport, 1983a). Worse still, 
this  unusual  cold  was  combined  with  strong,  persistent  north- 
westerly  winds.  The  latter  drove  the  Ayon  ice  massif,  a  semi- 
permanent field of multi-year ice normally located north of 
Ostrov  Ayon  but  usually  retreating  far  enough  north  over  the 
summer to permit free passage south of it, hard against the 
Chukotka  coast  from  Mys  Shelagskiy  to  Mys  Billingsa.  To  the 
east  it  was  equally  solidly  jammed  against  another  semi- 
permanent  ice  massif,  the  Vrangel’, so that  between  the  two  of 
them  they  effectively  blocked  Proliv  Longa. 
FIG. 2. Noril’sk, sister  ship to the SA-15 iœbreaking  freighters Arkhangel’sk, 
Bratsk, Igarka, Monchegorsk, Nizhneyansk and O h ,  which played such a 
distinguished  role in the crisis. (Photo: R. Gierke) 
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Aware  of  the  dangerous  situation  developing,  the  authorities 
diverted  four  icebreakers  from  their  area  of  operations  in  the 
western  Arctic,  the  nuclear-powered  icebreakers Lenin (Fig. 
3) and Leonid Brezhnev (Fig. 4) and the conventional ice- 
breakers Kapitan  Sorokin (Fig. 5) and Kapitan  Dranitsyn 
(Daygorodov and Martyshin, 1983b). Their help was soon 
needed. By early  October  groups  of  freighters  and  icebreakers 
were  jammed  helplessly  in  the  ice  at  various  points  between 
the  Novosibirskiye  Ostrova  and  Bering  Strait. And  it  was  not 
long  before  reports  of  serious  damage  began to be received. 
THE  CASUALTIES 
Early  in  October  the  freighter Nina  Sagaydak (Fig. 6), one 
of a  convoy  of  ships  westward  bound  to  Pevek  that  was  caught 
by the  ice  near  Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov,  a  little  to  the  east  of  Mys 
Shmidta,  found  herself  in  serious  difficulties.  Built  at  Rostock, 
East Germany, by the Schiffswerft Neptun in 1970, Nina 
Sagaydak was one of a class of 31 almost identical small 
freighters of between 341  1  and  3684  gross  tons;  she  was  105.7 
m long, with a beam  of 15.65 m and  engines of 3250  bhp,  giv- 
ing  her  a  top  speed  of 13.75 knots.  On 6 October  1983  she  was 
caught in multi-year ice 3-m thick being driven against the 
edge of the  fast  ice,  and  soon  irresistible  ice  pressures  began  to 
build up (Shmyganovskiy, 1983a; Vodnyy Transport, 1983a). 
Massive  pressure  ridges  piled  up  against  her  sides,  with  enor- 
mous  ice  blocks  tumbling  over  her  rails.  Her  stem  was  forced 
against  the  fast  ice  and  her  rudder  and  propeller  were  jammed. 
FIG. 6. The freighter Galya Komlew, which  played a minor role in  the crisis. 
Her sister ship Nina Sagayduk was crushed and sank, while another sister 
ship, Kolya Myagotin, was severely damaged. Other sister ships involved 
were Tolya Shwnov, Borya Tsarikov and Viva Sinitsa. (Photo: E.A. Wilson 
collection) 
To  compound  the  difficulties  the  freighter  next  collided  with 
the  tanker Kamensk-Urul'skiy (Fig. 7), also  drifting  helplessly 
in the  ice (Vodnyy Transport, 1983b).  For  over  half an  hour 
the  ships  ground  against  each  other,  and  despite  frantic  efforts 
to place fenders between the two hulls, both ships received 
some  damage; Nina  Sagaydak came off worst.  Her  crew  was 
rather  startled  to see the  tanker's  crew  pouring  water  down  the 
sides of their  ship  at  the  points of  contact  between  the  hulls  in 
case  sparks  caused by the  grinding  and  pounding  might  ignite 
fumes  from  the  tanker's  cargo.  The  two  ships  ultimately 
drifted  apart, but  even  worse  was  in  store  for Nina Sagaydak. 
As the ice pressures continued, her hull plates began to 
crack and the water began to rise inexorably in the engine 
room. Despite every effort her pumps were unable to cope 
with  the  enormous  influx  of  water  and  the  ship  began  to  list 
heavily  to  starboard.  When  the  list  had  reached  the  alarming 
angle of 40" the  chief  engineer  brought  all  his  men  on  deck 
and  the  captain  gave  orders for the  crew  of 45, and  a  further  6 
men  accompanying  the  ship's cargo, to be lifted  off by heli- 
copters  from  the  icebreakers Kapitan  Sorokin and Vladivostok, 
which  were  standing  by,  unable  to  save  the  sinking  vessel. 
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FIG. 7. The  tanker Kamensk-Ural’skiy, which  was  heavily  involved in  the 1983 
crisis; sister  ships that also played  important  roles  were Samtlor, Urengoy, 
Berezovo, Nizhnewnovsk, Usinsk, Yeniseysk and Igrim. (Photo: B. Sjostrom) 
The  ship  stubbornly  remained  afloat, held  up  by  the ice  and 
with  her  engines  and  pumps  still  running  unattended  for  almost 
a  day.  Finally,  early  on  the  evening  of 8 October,  while  her 
crew  watched  helplessly  from Kapitan  Sorokin barely  a  ship’s 
length away, Nina  Sagaydak sank by the  head.  Her  crew  was 
flown  south  to  Vladivostok (Vodnyy  Transport, 1983a),  and  a 
commission  of  enquiry  into  the  loss  of  the  ship  was  convened 
at Pevek.  It  concluded  that  no  blame  attached to any  of  the  of- 
ficers or crew  members  and  that  everything  possible  had  been 
done  to  save  the  ship. 
Nina Sagaydak was  the  first ship to be sunk by ice  in  the 
Soviet  Arctic  since  the  brand-new  freighter Vitimles was 
crushed  and  sank  in  October  1965.  But  for  a  while  it  appeared 
highly probable that several more ships might share Nina 
Sagaydak’s fate. 
On  the  day  that  she  sank, her sister  ship Kolya Myagotin, 
built  in  Rostock  in  1969  and  now one of  a  convoy  of  ships  east- 
ward  bound  through  Proliv  Longa,  found  herself  in  difficulties 
midway  between  the  eastern  end  of  Ostrov  Vrangelya  and  the 
mainland. Caught between two massive ice floes, she was 
holed  first  in  the  bow  section,  where  tanks  beneath  number-3 
hold  were  crushed  (Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983a).  Then 
she  was  holed  along  a  7-m  length  of  her  side  in  the  area  of 
number-2  hold.  The  latter  filled  with  water  in  less  than  half  an 
hour. As a  precaution  most  of  her  crew  was  evacuated by heli- 
copter to the icebreakers Kapitan Khlebnikov and Yermak, 
which  were  standing  by,  while  a  skeleton  crew  of  five  battled 
to keep  the  ship  afloat.  But  finally  even  this  group  was  forced 
to  abandon  ship as the  ice  continued  to  squeeze  her  hull.  They 
left the engines, diesel generators and pumps running. Then 
from the safety of the nearby icebreakers Kapitan Tsikunov 
and  his  crew  settled  down  to  await  events. 
Next  day  the  ice  slackened  and  the floes gripping  the  ship 
separated; she heeled some 30” to port, then rolled back to 
starboard. Ultimately she ended up on an even keel-still 
afloat. Encouraged by this, and with permission from head- 
quarters at Pevek,  Tsikunov  led  his men back  aboard  and  they 
renewed  the  battle  for  the  ship’s  life.  Divers  applied  a  patch to 
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the worst hole, and the job of pumping out number-2 hold 
began;  by  the  1 lth the  water  depth  had  dropped  to  only 50 cm 
(Balakirev,  1983a)  and  the  crew  could  start  work  on  placing 
cement  patches  inside  the  hull.  For  this  task  large  amounts  of 
sand and cement were required;  these  were  ferried  out  from 
shore by helicopter. By midnight on 14 October 1 L/i tonnes 
had already been delivered.  Once  the  cement  patches  were  se- 
curely in place and the water pumped out, the icebreakers 
Kapitan  Khlebnikov and Magadan broke Kolya  Myagotin 
loose  and  began  the  slow,  tedious  task  of  escorting  her  out to 
the  edge  of  the  ice,  some  1  15 km to  the  east  (Daygorodov  and 
Martyshin, 1983a). 
It  was  a  frustrating trip; the  outer  patch  on  one  occasion  was 
torn off  by the  ice  and  the  water  level  again  rose  in  the  hold. 
Once  more  the  divers  had  to  struggle  in  the  icy  water  to  re- 
place the patch; once they had succeeded, the water was 
pumped  out  and  the  slow  progress  eastward  was  resumed.  At 
one  stage  a  message  was  received  from  headquarters  at  Pevek 
to  the  effect  that  the  task  should be abandoned  if it  appeared 
totally  hopeless.  The  pumps  already in operation  simply  could 
not  handle  the  inflow  of  water;  but  another  two  pumps  were 
flown  out  to  the  ship  and  soon  the  water  level  began  to  drop. 
Later 30 empty containers were unloaded onto the ice and 
some  full  ones  were  transferred  to the  freighter Okha 
(Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983d),  giving  the  repair  crews 
easier  access  to  the  holes  in  the  hull. 
Finally  the  crippled  ship  reached  open  water  at  about  177”W 
on  17  October  (Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983c),  and  since 
the  leaks  were now under  control  Tsikunov  wanted  to  push  on 
eastward  to  Bering  Strait.  But  the  authorities  at  marine  opera- 
tions  headquarters  at  Pevek  were  more  cautious;  they  wanted 
to avoid any possibility of Kolya Myagotin running into a 
storm and knew that gale-force winds with heavy seas were 
forecast  for  the  Bering  Strait area. Hence  the  following 
message  was  transmitted  to  Tsikunov:  “Do  not  begin  without 
permission. You will be given a marine forecast every six 
hours” (Gorbacheva and Zhityakov, 1983a). Kapitan Khleb- 
nikov and Magadan were  ordered to continue to  stand  by  her 
where  she  lay  in  the  relative  security  of  the  edge  of  the  pack 
and to escort her to Bukhta Provideniya when conditions 
improved. 
Finally on 21 October, when the forecasts seemed auspi- 
cious, Magadan took the crippled ship in tow on a 350-m 
towline for the 640-km run to Bukhta Provideniya; Kapitan 
Khlebnikov was  still  standing  by  (Sergeyev,  1983a).  Next  day 
they  had  reached the  longitude of  Mys  Dezhneva  (Daygorodov 
and  Martyshin,  1983e)  and  on  the  23rd  emerged  through  Ber- 
ing  Strait  into  the  Bering  Sea (Zzvestiya, 1983a).  Even  now  the 
pumps  were  still  operating  nonstop  in  order  to  keep  the  ship 
afloat;  two  more  pumps had  been  set  up  in  number-2  hold,  for 
a  total  capacity  of 750 m3.h”,  and  the  water  level  was  drop- 
ping steadily. Kapitan  Khlebnikov’s captain estimated that 
they would reach Bukhta Provideniya at 2300 on the 23rd. 
And indeed this forecast was accurate almost to the minute 
(Daygorodov and Martyshin, 19830; at 2300 Magadan ‘and 
the  salvage  tug Bars eased Kolya Myagotin up to  the  quayside 
(Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  19838). 
SOVIET ARCTIC SHIPPING CRISIS, 1983 
Despite  the  fact  that  Bukhta  Provideniya  does  not  possess  a 
dry  dock  or  any  proper  facilities  for  repairs  to  the  hull of a  ship 
of Kolya Myagotin’s size, work on the ship began almost 
immediately. About 30 containers and 160 tonnes of lumber 
(some  of  it  actually  destined  for  Bukhta  Provideniya)  were  un- 
loaded;  then  some  scrap  metal  was  transferred  from  number-1 
hold  to  number-4  hold,  all  of  this  with  a  view  to  heeling  the 
ship.  Once  the  damaged  section  was  above  the  water,  repair 
crews went to work (Daygorodov et al.,  1983). From this 
point on Kolya Myagotin was no longer mentioned in the 
periodic “crisis reports” transmitted from Pevek, since she 
was considered to be completely out of danger (Sergeyev, 
1983b).  Once  the  damage  to  her  hull  had  been  properly 
patched, Kolya  Myagotin started  on  the  long  voyage  south  to 
Vladivostok, where permanent repairs would be made. Her 
captain and crew and the men of Kapitan Khlebnikov and 
Magadan could  rightly  be  proud  of  what  they  had  achieved. 
THE CRISIS UNFOLDS 
When the first  Soviet  newspaper  reports of trouble in the 
eastern  Arctic  began  to  appear  toward  the  middle  of  October, 
it  was clear  that  the  situation  was  quite  serious.  The  group  of 
ships  with  which Nina  Sagaydak was  travelling - freighters 
Pioner  Kamchatki.(Fig . 8), Pioner Rossii, Pioner  Uzbekistana 
and Amguyema (Fig. 9), tankers Urengoy and Kamensk-Ura1’- 
skiy and  escorting  icebreakers Kapitan  Sorokin and Leningrad 
(Fig. 10) - was  firmly  jammed  off  Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov  (Bala- 
kirev, 1983a). A situation report from the captain of Lenin- 
grad on  11  October  included  the  following  information:  wind 
NW, 12 mps; temperature - 13°C; fog; snow; visibility 2-3 
cables;  10  tenths ice; pressure  force  1-2.  In 3% hours Lenin- 
grad had  managed to  advance  one  ship’s  length.  The  nuclear- 
powered  icebreaker Leonid  Brezhnev had  sailed  from  Pevek 
on  Chaunskaya  Guba  to  come  to  the  convoy’s  rescue,  but  it 
was  significant  that  her  divers  had  only just finished  replacing 
blades  on  one  of  her  three  propellers  that  had  been  lost  earlier 
in heavy ice (Shmyganovskiy , 1983a),  a  task  that  had  taken 
them two days (Kurasov, 1983). Initially on leaving Pevek 
Leonid  Brezhnev was escorting  the  freighter Igarka and in  two 
hours had managed to escort her 30 km. But then Igarka’s 
steering gear was damaged, and while her crew set about 
repairs Leonid  Brezhnev pushed  on  eastward  alone  (Daygoro- 
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dov  and Martyshin,  1983b). By 14 October Igarka was  again 
under  way,  forging  westward  through  the  ice  on  her  own. 
Farther west, to the west of Ostrov  Ayon  in  the  East 
Siberian  Sea,  another  convoy  was  beset  and  drifting.  It  con- 
sisted of the Noril’sk class  freighter Nizhneyansk, the  tanker 
Nizhnevartovsk and  the  refrigerated  ship Khudozhnik S. 
Gerasimov (Fig. 11). Heading to their rescue on 12 October 
were  the  nuclear-powered  icebreaker Lenin and  the Noril’sk 
class freighter Arkhangel’sk (Vodnyy Transport, 1983a). On 
the  14th  it  was  reported  that Lenin had  broken  through  the  bar- 
rier of the  Ayon  massif  leading  a convoy  consisting  of 
Arkhangel’sk,  Vasiliy  Yan,  Fedor  Okhlopkov and Isidor 
Barakhov, all bound for Tiksi. Then, turning around, Lenin 
escorted Nizhneyansk and Khudozhnik S. Gerasimov back to 
Pevek  while Arkhangel’sk continued  west  with  the  other 
freighters (Daygorodov and Martyshin, 1983b). 
Also on the 14th several of the ships jammed near Kosa 
Dvukh Pilotov managed to get free with the help of Leonid 
Brezhnev,  Yermuk,  Admiral  Makarov and Vladivostok and 
emerged  at  the  eastern  edge  of  the  ice  in  the  Chukchi  Sea,  hav- 
ing battled through about 100 km of ice. They included the 
freighters Borya Tsarikov, Yevgeniy  Chaplanov,  Vladimir 
Mordvinov and Pioner Kamchatki  (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 
1983a;  Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983b). 
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By the  17th, with  daylight  steadily  shortening  and  a  temper- 
ature  at  Pevek  of - 25 OC, there  were  several  significant  devel- 
opments  in  the  critical  situation.  Although  she  had  lost  a  blade 
from  one  propeller, Leonid  Brezhnev was  successfully  contin- 
uing her  struggle  to free the  ships  jammed  near Kosa  Dvukh 
Pilotov. By now the  number  of  these  ships  that  had  reached  the 
edge of the  ice in the  Chukchi  Sea  had  risen  to  nine  (Daygoro- 
dov  and Martyshin, 1983~). And  by the  17th  the  first of them, 
Borya Tsarikov and Vladimir Mordvinov, were already ap- 
proaching  Bering  Strait. 
However,  there  were  still  five  ships n a  serious  situation off 
Kosa Dvukh Pilotov, with Kapitan Sorokin and Leningrad 
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standing  by.  Having  freed  all  the  others, Leonid  Brezhnev,  Ad- 
miral Makarov and Yermuk were now heading for this last 
handful,  the  latter  two  ships  having  resupplied  and  bunkered 
from  the  freighter Okha. 
Much farther  west Arkhangel'sk (Kapitan R. Igritskiy), now 
joined by the  icebreaker Semen Chelyuskin, had  succeeded  in 
escorting Vasiliy Yan, Fedor  Owllopkov and Zsidor  Barakhov 
to Tiksi (Fig. 12). From there, escorting the freighter Kon- 
stantin Petrovskiy, Arkhangel'sk was now pushing on west- 
ward  to  Proliv  Vil'kitskogo.  Ahead  of  her Dikson, escorting 
Galya  Komleva, was  approaching  the  eastern  end  of  that  strait 
by the  17th.  Passing  through  the  strait  eastward  bound  was  the 
nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir' (Fig. 13), which had just 
escorted  a  convoy of eight  ships  westward.  They  were  now  all 
proceeding  across  the  Kara  Sea  independently,  with  the  excep- 
tion  of Kapitan Gotskiy, which  the  icebreaker Murmunsk was 
escorting (Daygorodov and Martyshin, 1983~). 
There  were  still  two  groups of ships in trouble in  the  East 
Siberian Sea; the freighters Vankarem, Baykonur, Mekhanik 
Zheltovskiy and Tolya  Shumov were  beset  between  the 
Medvezh'iye  Ostrova  and  Mys  Lopatka.  Farther  west,  off  the 
mouth  of  the  Indigirka, Berezovo, Novik (Fig. 14) and 
Solnechnyy were in a  similar  predicament. Lenin, which had 
lost a propeller blade, was battling to extricate the tanker 
Nizhnevartovsk from the ice near Ostrov Ayon, assisted by 
Kapitan Dranitsyn. And finally Igarka and six ships a short 
distance  away  from  her  were  jammed  near  Mys  Shelagskiy . 
Apart from all these a further nine vessels were lying at 




FIG. 12. The eastern half of the Northern Sea Route. 
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west.  Among  them  were Khudozhnik S. Gerasimov, which  had 
just  docked  after  being  extricated  from  the  ice by Lenin and 
Kapitan Dranitsyn, and the freighter Kapitan Samoylenko, 
which the  longshoremen  had just discharged  in  two days in- 
stead  of  the  normal  three.  Now  unloading  was Nizhneyansk, 
which Lenin had just escorted to port, on  her  third trip of  the 
season (Gorbacheva and Zhityakov, 1983a; Kurasov, 1983). 
Also lying  in  the  port  were  the  freighter B atsk and  the  old  ice- 
breaker Georgiy  Sedov, which the  former  ship had  towed  in 
minus three  propeller  blades  and  with  her  rudder  out  of  action. 
On the  17th  the  port  officials  and  longshoremen  were  gearing 
up  to  receive  the  tanker Nizhnevartovsk, but deteriorating  ice 
conditions  had  brought  the  tanker  to  a  complete  halt  practically 
within sight of the port, despite the efforts of Lenin and 
Kapitan Dranitsyn (Zhityakov, 1983). 
That  afternoon  a  radio  message  reached  marine  operations 
headquarters  at  Pevek  from  the  the  freighter Vladimir Mord- 
vinov: “At 1500 we emerged from the ice edge into open 
water; now approaching  Bering  Strait. We thank  headquarters 
for  their  recommendations  and  help. We  wish  you a  successful 
completion  of  the  season.  Kapitan  Maslov”  (Zhityakov, 
1983). Vladimir  Mordvinov was  the  first  of  the  ships  caught in 
the  ice  of  Proliv  Longa to  escape  to  the east; it  had  taken  her 
two weeks. 
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By 19 Ocotober Leonid Brezhnev, Yermak and Admiral 
Makarov had  reached  the  remainder  of  the  ships  jammed off 
Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov;  these  were  the  tankers Kamnsk- 
Ural’skiy and Urengoy and  the  freighters Amguyema,  Pioner 
Uzbekistana and Pioner Rossii, all  bound  for Pevek 
(Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983d).  With Leonid Brezhnev 
leading  the  way,  followed by Yermak, and  with Admiral 
Makarov bringing  up  the  rear  towing Kamensk-Ural’skiy, the 
icebreakers  started  west;  this  was  an  unprecedented  operation 
- three  icebreakers  with  a  total  horsepower of 163 O00 hp 
escorting  a  single  tanker  (Sergeyev,  1983a).  Even so, progress 
was  frustratingly  slow  in  the  immensely  heavy  ice;  in  the  first 
eight  hours Kamensk-Ural  ’skiy had  progressed  only  two  cable 
lengths. 
Meanwhile, having escorted Nizhnevartovsk into Pevek, 
Lenin was lying off that harbour at the floe edge while her 
divers  replaced  her  broken  propeller  blade. Kapitan  Dranitsyn 
had  already  put  to  sea  again  early  on the 19th  (Gorbacheva  and 
Zhityakov,  1983a).  Off  Mys  Shelagskiy  she  had  broken  loose 
the  three  freighters Anton  Buyukly,  Kapitan  Samoylenko and 
Igarka and  had  begun  escorting  them  west.  Here  too  progress 
was  painfully  slow:  only  some  1  1 km in 2  hours.  Four  other 
freighters were waiting for assistance in the ice off Mys 
Shelagskiy, and the two groups mentioned earlier were still 
waiting  off  the  Medvezh’iye  Ostrova  and  off  the  Indigirka. 
But even farther west the news was more encouraging. 
Dikson, escorting Galya  Komleva, had  passed  through  Proliv 
Vil’kitskogo  and  was  forging  west  across  the  Kara  Sea.  In  the 
Laptev Sea Arkhungel’sk was  ploughing  west  with  the 
freighter Konstantin Petrovskiy. En route  they  had  passed  the 
icebreaker Kapitan Nikolayev, yet  another  icebreaker  transfer- 
red from the west to assist the 12 already working in the 
eastern  Arctic. By the  19th  she  was  approaching  Proliv  San- 
nikova,  having  escorted  ships  to  Tiksi. 
At  Pevek Nizhnevartovsk was  alongside  and  had  begun  dis- 
charging cargo; Khudozhnik S. Gerasimov was also  still  being 
unloaded. At the  same  time port workers  were  repairing un- 
specified  damage  suffered by  both ships. On  20  October  Pevek 
recorded  a  record  low  temperature  for  that  date: -26°C 
(Sergeyev,  1983a).  To  compound  the  difficulties  severe  mag- 
netic  storms  were  producing  an  almost  complete  radio  black- 
out.  The  following day it was predicted  that by the  23rd  there 
would not be a single sea-going ship left in Pevek harbour; 
only a fleet of seven riverhea vessels operated by Severo- 
Vostochnoye  upravleniye  morskogo flota and  the  harbour 
icebreaker V. Poyarkov were scheduled to winter at Pevek 
(Sergeyev, 1983a; Pushkar’, 1983). 
By 21  October Kapitan  Dranitsyn had  successfully  escorted 
Igarka, Kapitan  Samoylenko and Anton  Buyukly as  far as the 
Medvezh’iye  Ostrova,  returned  to Mys  Shelagskiy,  and 
started  back  west  with  five  ships.  They  included Vitya  Sinitsa 
and  the  tanker Nizhnevartovsk, which Lenin had  escorted  north 
from  Pevek  to  the  rendezvous. By  noon on  the 2 1st Kapitan 
Dranitsyn was  abeam  of  Mys  Bol’shoy  Baranov  with  this  sec- 
ond  convoy  (Daygorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983e).  In  the 
meantime Kapifan Nikohyev had reached the Medvezh’iye 
Ostrova  from  the  west,  freed Vankarem, Tolya Shumov, Me- 
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khanik Zheltovskiy and Baykonur and  started  back  west  with 
them; off the mouth of the Indigirka Berezovo, Novik, and 
Solnechnyy joined  the  convoy. 
In Proliv Longa Leonid Brezhnev, Yermak and Admiral 
Makarov had  by this  point  rescued  the  two  tankers Kamensk- 
Ural’skiy and Urengoy, escorting them slowly to a “safe 
zone”. While Yermak stayed  with  the  two  tankers,  the  other 
two  icebreakers  headed  back to Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov  and  next 
broke  loose  the  freighter Pioner  Rossii (Daygorodov  and  Mar- 
tyshin,  1983e).  Meanwhile  the  tanker Zgrim was  still  waiting 
patiently,  jammed  off  Mys  Yakan. On 21 October  Pevek  re- 
corded  a  temperature  of - 3 1  “C  (Daygorodov  and  Martyshin, 
1983e). 
A report  from  Pevek  listed  some of the  ships  that had by 
now undergone  repairs  there  due  to  ice  damage.  Apart  from 
ships  already  mentioned,  it  included Pioner  Chukotki,  Pioner 
Uzbekistana, Kapitan Kondratyev, Komiles, Kolya Myagotin 
and Maksim  Ammosov. 
It would  appear  that  even  at  this  stage  the  authorities  felt  the 
worst  was  still  to  come.  It  was  decided  on  24  October  to  trans- 
fer  yet  another  icebreaker, Krasin, from  the  western  Arctic  to 
the  crisis  zone  in  the  east  (Loginov,  1983a). On  that  same  date 
Sibir’ rendezvoused  in  Proliv  Sannikova  with Lenin,  Kapitan 
Dranitsyn and Kapitan Nikolayev, escorting  a  total of eleven 
ships  (Daygorodov  and  Martyshin, 19830, Sibir’ took  charge 
of  seven  of  these  and  forged  westward  across  the  Laptev  Sea. 
On the 24th Lenin and Kapitan Nikolayev were ploughing 
along  some  130 km astern of this  convey as they  escorted the 
other  four  freighters. Kapitan  Dranitsyn meanwhile  had  head- 
ed back east through the Ayon massif and started escorting 
another  six  freighters  to  the  west. 
By the 25th the last of the ships trapped off Kosa Dvukh 
Pilotov  had  been  rescued,  although  it had  taken Leonid 
Brezhnev,  Yermak and Admiral  Makarov more  than  two  days 
to  extricate  the  freighter Amguyemu. She  was  jammed  among 
ice  that  had  been  rafted  and  heaped  up to a  thickness  of 30 m, 
and the  three  icebreakers  had  taken  12  hours  simply  to  turn  the 
freighter  around.  The  convoluted  tracks  resulting  from  these 
and earlier maneuvers are clearly apparent on the Landsat 
image  (Fig.  15)  obtained  from  an  orbiting  NASA  Landsat  sat- 
ellite  on  24  October.  This  image  is  one  of  several  portraying 
the  progress  of  the  rescue  operations,  interpreted by the 
“Quick-Look” program of the Geophysical Institute of the 
University of  Alaska  (Miller,  1983,  1984). 
At this  point Kamensk-Ural ’skiy, Urengoy and Pioner  Rossii 
were  lying  in  the  safe zone, under  the  protection  of  the  ice- 
breaker Vladivostok. The  freighter Okha was  lying  only  some 
65 km away,  while Leningrad and Pioner  Uzbekistana were 
fighting their way north to the safe zone (Daygorodov and 
Martyshin, 19830. Hopes of some  improvement  were  pinned 
on  the  passage  of  an  extensive  cyclone  at  this  point;  it  did  raise 
temperatures  briefly to as high as - 3°C  for  a  couple of days, 
but  they soon plummeted  again as the  cold  front  came  through 
(Loginov,  1983a).  While Admiral  Makarov refuelled  and 
watered  from Okha, Leonid  Brezhnev and Yermak, their  task 
in the area of Kosa Dvukh Pilotov completed, next began 
ploughing southwest to Mys Yakan, where  the  tanker Zgrim 
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PIG. 15. Landsat  image of the ice off Kosa Dvukh Pilotov, 24 October 1983. 
The  convoluted  ship  tracks  at A were  made  by Leonid  Brezhnev,  Yermak, and 
Admiral MaGarov while freeing Kamensk-Ural’skiy, Urengoy, Amguyema, 
Pioner Uzbekistana and Pioner Rossii over the previous few days. Older 
tracks at B, already frozen over, were probably made during the rescue of 
such ships as Borya Tsarikov, Yevgeniy Chaplanov, Vlndimir  Mordvinov and 
Pioner  Kamchatki some  ten  days  earlier. 
had  been  jammed  against  the  fast  ice by  massive floes  for  three 
weeks (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1983b; Loginov, 1983~). Farther 
west Kapitan Dranitsyn, attempting  to  fight  her way  through 
the Ayon massif with yet another convoy (consisting of six 
ships  including  the  tanker Yeniseysk and  the freighter 
Khudozhnik S. Gerasimov), had  run  into  serious  difficulties. 
Fortunately Krasin, newly arrived from the western Arctic, 
was able  to  come  to  the  rescue  (Loginov,  1983b;  Gorbacheva 
and Zhityakov, 1983b). After two days adrift in the ice the 
convoy  began  forging  west  again  (Loginov,  1983c;  Daygoro- 
dov et al.,  1983). Meanwhile in Proliv Sannikova Kapitan 
Nikolayev had to  call  upon Lenin for  assistance when she and 
r  convoy  became  jammed  and  began  drifting  into  shallow 
water. 
News  of  an  encouraging  incident  travelled  rapidly  through- 
out  the eastern  Arctic  at  about  this  time.  The  captain of  the  ice- 
breaker Leningrad reported seeing walrus in a moonlit lead 
near  his  ship.  This  meant  that  leads and cracks  were  presum- 
ably  still  open  all  the way from  the  area  of  Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov 
east to the open water in the Chukchi Sea (Gorbacheva and 
Zhityakov, 1983b). 
On  26th  October  the  convoys  escorted  by Sibir ’ and Lenin, 
which  had  again  amalgamated to form  a  convoy  of  15  ships 
(escorted  in  addition by Kapitan Nikolayev and Murmunsk), 
were  ploughing  west  across  the  Laptev  Sea  and  had  crossed 
the  official  boundary  between  the  eastern  and  western  Arctic, 
namely the 125”E meridian, which passes through the Lena 
delta (Loginov, 1983~). Meanwhile in Proliv Longa on that 
same  date  the Noril’sk class  freighter Monchegorsk was  mak- 
ing  her way toward  the  convoy  of  ships  that  had  been  rescued 
from  Kosa  Dvukh  Pilotov  and  was  now  lying  in  a  safe  zone  of 
relatively  loose  ice,  namely Pioner Uzbekistana, Amguyemu, 
Okha, Pioner  Rossii and  the  tankers Urengoy and Kamensk- 
SOVIET ARCTIC SHIPPING CRISIS, 1983 
Ural 'skiy. The  icebreakers Vladivostok, Leningrad and 
Kapitan  Sorokin were  already  standing by this  convoy 
(Daygorodov et al., 1983). Leningrad had lost some power 
due  to  malfunctions  in  two of her  eight  diesels,  while Pioner 
Uzbekistana had  had  the  lower  half  of  her  rudder tom off  and 
the  remainder of  it  badly  bent.  Having  escorted Kolya Mya- 
gotin safely  to  Bukhta  Provideniya, Kapitan  Khlebnikov was 
now hurrying back west with supplies for her sister ice- 
breakers (Balakirev, 1983b). By this stage Leonid Brezhnev 
and Yennak were  within  36 km of Igrim near  Mys  Yakan;  their 
plan  was  to  break  her  loose  and  escort  her  east  to join Admiral 
Makarov's convoy. All  of  this  activity  was  occurring  against 
the  background  of  the  inexorable  approach  of  winter; by the 
26th  the  new  ice  in  Bukhta  Pevek  had  reached a  thickness of  29 
cm  and  was  thickening at  a rate of 6 cm per day (Sergeyev, 
1983b). 
The good news  was  received  on  28  October  that  the  massive 
convoy  of  15  ships  escorted  by Sibir ', Lenin, Munnansk and 
Kapitan Nikolayev had safely negotiated Proliv Vil'kitskogo 
into the relatively easy conditions of the Kara Sea (Day- 
gorodov  and  Martyshin,  1983g).  The  news  from  the  vicinity  of 
Ostrov Ayon was not so good, however. Despite Krasin's 
powerful  assistance, Kapitan  Dranitsyn and  her  convoy  of  6 
ships  was  making  only  extremely  slow  progress  through  very 
heavy ice.  Indeed  progress  was  being  annulled by  an easterly 
ice  drift  with  a  speed  of 2 knots. 
A little  farther east, near  Mys  Yakan,  the  news  was  better: 
Leonid  Brezhnev and Yennak had  succeeded  in  freeing Igrim. 
Farther  east  again,  having  transferred  some of her  cargo  to 
Pioner  Rossii and Okha, the  damaged Pioner  Uzbekistana had 
emerged from the eastern edge of the ice, escorted by the 
partly  disabled Leningrad, both  were  now  bound for 
Egvekinot . 
In  Proliv  Longa Admiral  Makarov and Kapitan Sorokin had 
led  the  tanker Urengoy north  to  a  polynya  off  Mys  Blossom  at 
the  southwest  tip  of  Ostrov  Vrangelya.  Once L onid  Brezhnev 
had joined  them  the  plan  was  to  escort  the  tanker  southwest  to 
Pevek. Meanwhile the other five ships rescued from Kosa 
Dvukh Pilotov, now joined by Igrim, were  lying  adrift  at  the 
eastern  edge of  the  ice  in  the  Chukchi  Sea,  under  the  protec- 
tion  of Kapitan  Khlebnikov and Vladivostok. 
By the end of the month Sibir', Lenin, Munnansk and 
Kapitan  Nikolayev had  safely  reached  Dikson  with  their  con- 
voy of 15 ships,  and Sibir' and Lenin had  again  started  back 
east,  escorting  the  tanker Samotlor, bound  from  Arkhangel'sk 
to  Pevek.  They  would,  if  necessary,  assist Krasin and Kapitan 
Dranitsyn, which  had  now  managed to free their  convoy  of  6 
ships and were pushing west across the East Siberian Sea 
(Martyshin,  1983b).  Having  passed  north of the  Medvezh'iye 
Ostrova, they  had  set  a  course  to  round  the  north of the  Novo- 
sibirskiye Ostrova; at last report on 31 October they had 
covered the respectable distance of 65 km in a four-hour 
watch. 
In Proliv Longa Leonid Brezhnev and Admiral Makarov, 
escorting Urengoy, were making slow progress southwest- 
ward  toward  Pevek;  in  one  %-hour  period  they  covered  only  3 
km (Loginov, 1983e). Meanwhile Pioner Uzbekistana had 
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passed  through  Bering  Strait  and by 3  1  October  was  starting  to 
unload  at  Egvekinot. Yennak, too, was  heading  out  of  the  Arc- 
tic  Ocean  for  repairs.  It  was  decided  that  the  damage  she  had 
suffered  could  not  be  tackled by her  own  divers  among  surg- 
ing, heaving ice floes. Moreover at Bukhta Provideniya she 
could  also  call  upon  the  port's  own  divers  and  all  the  facilities 
of the salvage tug Bars to help with the repairs (Loginov, 
1983d). Kapitan Khlebnikov and Igrim were also eastward 
bound  to  Bering  Strait  and  more  hospitable  waters. 
On the night of 2 November the temperature dropped to 
-36°C at  Pevek; by this  time Leonid  Brezhnev and Admiral 
Makarov, escorting Urengoy, were  approaching  Pevek; Okha 
and Kapitan Sorokin were  still  lying in the  safe  zone  of  the 
Mys Blossom polynya; and Vladivostok, with a further six 
ships,  was  lying  at  the  eastern  edge  of  the  ice  in  the  Chukchi 
Sea (Martyshin, 1983b). Reports from Leonid Brezhnev re- 
vealed  something  of  the  conditions  under  which  she  and  her 
companion  vessels  were  working. Admiral  Makarov was  tow- 
ing Urengoy but the towline was repeatedly breaking in the 
heavy ice. Late in the evening of the 2nd Urengoy reached 
Pevek, and the little harbour icebreaker Vasiliy  Poyarkov 
helped  the  big  sea-going  icebreakers  to  maneuver  the  tanker 
alongside.  The  first of the  ships  jammed  for so long  off  Kosa 
Dvukh  Pilotov  had  finally  reached  her  destination.  She  and  the 
icebreakers  were  given  a  tumultuous  welcome by the  crowds 
on  the  quayside.  This  was  the  latest date, by several  weeks,  on 
which any ship had reached Pevek (Sotsialisticheskaya In- 
dustriya, 1983).  Having  taken  on fuel, supplies  and  water  and 
once  some  repairs  had  been  made  to  her  towing gear, Admiral 
Makarov, escorted by Leonid  Brezhnev, set  off  again  on  the 
3rd, escorting the small icebreaker research vessel Georgiy 
Sedov, which  had  been  quite  badly  damaged  but  had now  been 
sufficiently repaired for her to put to sea again (Loginov, 
1983e). 
Off  Mys  Blossom Okha and Monchegorsk were  waiting  for 
Leonid  Brezhnev and Admiral  Makarov to  return.  Meanwhile, 
after hurried repairs Yermuk was hurrying back west from 
Bukhta Provideniya to assist in escorting  the  remaining  five 
ships  to  Pevek.  Farther west Krasin and Kapitan Dranitsyn, 
escorting  their  convoy of six  vessels  around  the  north  of  the 
Novosibirskiye  Ostrova,  had  crossed  the  144"  meridian, i.e., 
the  meridian of Ostrov  Faddeyevskiy , on  3  November  (Log- 
inov, 19830. It was one of  the  ironies  of  the  ice  situation  that 
conditions were easier along this northerly route than via 
either  Proliv  Sannikova or Proliv  Lapteva  farther  south. 
On the  evening  of 5 November,  after  the  usual  celebrations 
on the anniversary of the October Revolution, many of the 
celebrants in  Pevek  headed  down to  the  harbour  to  welcome 
the  freighter Okha, which  had just arrived, escorted by Leonid 
Brezhnev and Kapitan  Sorokin, and  was  mooring  (Martyshin, 
1983~). In  her  holds was a  variety  of  freight  transshipped  from 
the  damaged Pioner  Uzbekistana and  a  number  of other  ships 
unable  to  tackle  the  severe  ice  conditions.  Even  before  she ar- 
rived  the  Pevek  longshoremen  challenged  her  crew  by  radio  to 
a  competition  with  a  view  to  discharging  her  cargo as rapidly 
as  possible.  After  an  extremely  fast  urn-around, Leonid 
Brezhnev and Kapitan  Sorokin started back to  the  Mys 
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Blossom “refuge”. Escorted by Yermak and Vladivostok, the 
tanker Kamensk-Ural’skiy and the freighters Pioner Rossii, 
Monchegorsk and Amguyema were  also  heading for the  same 
destination  from  the  ice  edge  to  the  east. 
Well to  the  west, just as Krasin and Kapitan  Dranitsyn had 
done, Lenin and Sibir ’, escorting Samotlor, were  rounding  the 
Novosibirskiye Ostrova on the north. On 5 November they 
were  off  the  northern  tip  of  Ostrov  Kotel’nyy  and  were  making 
good progress; in  one  four-hour  watch  they  covered 76 km. 
Having  rendezvoused  with Kamensk-Ural ’skiy, Amguyema, 
Pioner  Rossii and Monchegorsk off  Mys  Blossom  on 8 
November, Leonid  Brezhnev, Yermak and Admiral  Makarov 
started  back  southwest  with  this  convoy,  bound  for  Pevek. Un- 
fortunately a massive cyclone now swept into the area with 
gale-force winds that jammed the ice together (Daygorodov 
and Martyshin, 198331). To complicate the situation further, 
the  sun  now  disappeared for  the  last  time  for  the  winter. At the 
longitude of Mys Billingsa, some 195 km from Pevek, the 
convoy was brought to a complete stop in heavy ice under 
severe  pressures. 
Another  convoy  approaching  Pevek  from  the  other  direction 
was  also  encountering  difficulties  due  to  severe  ice  pressures 
caused  by  this storm; Sibir’ and Krasin, escorting Samotlor, 
were approaching Ostrov Ayon on the 8th but were making 
only 2-3 km per  watch  in  heavy ice. In  view  of  this  general 
deterioration in conditions, Lenin, which had headed back 
west,  was  ordered  to  start  east  for  Pevek  once  again. 
On a more encouraging note, the icebreaker Vladivostok, 
towing the damaged Georgiy Sedov, had emerged through 
Bering  Strait  into  the  open  waters of the  Bering  Sea.  Mean- 
while  at  Pevek  the  unloading  of Okha’s cargo had  been com- 
pleted  12  hours  ahead  of  schedule,  and  along  with Urengoy the 
freighter was now awaiting the arrival of the final convoys 
(Daygorodov and Martyshin, 198331). 
The  following  ten  days  saw  a  remarkable  change  in  the  sit- 
uation. By 19  November Samotlor, from  the  west,  and  all  five 
ships from the east had reached Pevek safely and most had 
been  unloaded  and  left  again.  Rather  frustratingly  the  Soviet 
press  coverage, so detailed  with  regard  to  the  earlier  phases  of 
the  crisis, now became extremely meagre. However the fol- 
lowing  can  be  established: Lenin set  off  westward,  escorting 
Monchegorsk, and by 23 November was rounding the north 
side of Novosibirskiye  Ostrova  (Martyshin, 1983~). Sibir’ had 
apparently  first  led  two  ships  from  Pevek  to  the  safe  zone  off 
Mys  Blossom,  then  returned  for  a  second  convoy.  Assisted  by 
Leonid  Brezhnev,  Yermak,  Admiral  Makarov,  Krasin and  one 
other icebreaker, she also escorted this convoy (Amguyema, 
Okha and Urengoy) safely  northeast  to  Mys  Blossom;  here  the 
first two ships joined the convoy and the combined force 
fought  its  way  out to  the  edge  of  the  heaviest  ice  (Martyshin, 
1983~). From here Admiral Makarov and Yermak would be 
able to escort the convoy on their own; so once Krasin had 
bunkered from Yermak, the  former  ship,  along with the two 
nuclear-powered  icebreakers Leonid  Brezhnev and Sibir ’ 
(which  of  course  did  not  require  to  bunker)  started  back  west. 
Meanwhile the last ship to sail from Pevek, the tanker 
Kamensk-Ural’skiy, had  put to sea, escorted by Kapitan 
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Sorokin, and  by 23  November  the  two  ships  had  reached  Mys 
Shelagskiy , where they awaited the arrival of the powerful 
team  of Sibir’, Leonid  Brezhnev and Krasin. Although  it  is  not 
entirely  clear  from  the  Soviet  press  reports,  Armstrong  (1984) 
has suggested that, following Lenin’s lead,  this  final convoy 
also headed west. In that there were no later reports of the 
movements  of  these  convoys,  one may  assume  they  all  reached 
their  destinations  safely.  Some  indication  of h w  long  this  may 
have  taken  is  provided  by a  report  from  Vladivostok  dated  10 
December  1983  to  the  effect  that Admiral  Makarov had just 
returned  to  her  home port. 
CONTROL,  ORGANIZATION AND SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT 
The brunt of the task of monitoring and supervising the 
deployment  and  operations of icebreakers  and  ships  through- 
out  this  crisis  fell  on  the  Marine  Operations  Headquarters for 
the  eastern  Arctic  at  Pevek,  and  especially  on  its  head  (Bal- 
akirev,  1983a). But a crisis of  this  magnitude  inevitably  also 
occupied  the  attention  of  senior  officials  in  Moscow,  and  cer- 
tainly the decision to transfer so many icebreakers from the 
west to the  east had to  be  made in  Moscow.  However,  the  real 
measure  of  how serious  the  crisis was  seen  to  be  was  that  in 
early  October  a  number  of  senior  officials  flew  from  Moscow 
to  Pevek  to  be closer  to  the  action;  they  included  the  head of 
Glavflot, the  chairman  of V/o “Moreplavaniye”, and  the  head 
of Administratsiya Sevmorputi (Daygorodov and Martyshin, 
1983b). All of these officials made frequent trips in the ice 
reconnaissance aircraft to keep themselves abreast of  the 
rapidly  changing  situation  (Solov’yev,  1983;  Daygorodov  and 
Martyshin, 1983d). 
In  Moscow  at  the Minsterstvo  Morskogo  Flota a  temporary 
coordinating  centre  was  set  up  under  the  deputy  minister.  Ad- 
vising  him  were  men  such  as  the first  deputy  head  of GlavJot, 
the  deputy  chairman  of Administratsiya  Sevmorputi, the  chief 
state  inspector  for Administratsiya  Sevmorputi, and  the  head  of 
the Gidrometeobyuro of Goskomgidromet (Daygorodov and 
Martyshin, 1983b). 
Operating from the Pevek headquarters was a group of 
weather  and  ice  forecasters  reporting  to  the  head of  the scien- 
tific operations group (Solov’yev, 1983). A parallel depart- 
ment handled ice-escorting operations. But given the crisis 
situation  it  was  decided  to  bring in scientific  reinforcements; 
on 19 October a group of meteorologists and hydrologists 
from the Arkticheskiy i Antarkticheskiy Nauchno-lssledova- 
tel  ’skiy Znstitut left  Leningrad  for  Pevek  to  provide  some  relief 
for  their  overburdened  colleagues  (Daygorodov  and  Mar- 
tyshin, 1983d). 
All  these  scientists  relied  on  a  number  of  sources  for  ice  in- 
formation.  Apart  from  reports  from  the  ships  themselves and 
from ship-based hydrologists, a wider view of the situation 
was provided by regular  reports  from Ilyushin 14 ice  recon- 
naissance  aircraft  flown by the Kolymo-Indigirskoye  Aviapred- 
priyatiye (Shmyganovskiy,  1983a).  Finally,  extensive  use was 
made of satellite imagery, especially once winter darkness 
greatly  limited  the  effectiveness  of  visual  reconnaissances  of 
various  kinds.  Particular  use  was  made of  images  provided  by 
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side-looking  radar  aboard  the  Cosmos  1500 icedetection sat- 
ellite, which,  providentially, had  been  launched  on 28 
September 1983 (Aerospace Daily, 1984). 
In  view  of  this  concentration  of  scientific  expertise  to 
resolve  the  crisis  once  it  had  developed,  it  is  relevant  to  ponder 
the question of whether the severe ice conditions could not 
have been predicted. And indeed precisely this topic was 
raised  by Ye. Tolstikov,  deputy  chairman  of Goskomitet SSSR 
PO gidrometeorologii i kontrolyu prirodnoy sredy (State  Com- 
mittee of  the USSR on  Hydrometeorology  and  Environmental 
Control) in  an  end-of-year  “post  mortem”  on  the  crisis  (Tol- 
stikov, 1983). According to his assessment, while the six- 
month forecast issued by the scientists at AANII in March 
1983, so critical for planning the coming season, had been 
seriously inaccurate, later corrections were remarkably ac- 
curate.  Thus  an  amended  forecast  issued  on  12  July  stated  that 
the  Ayon  massif  was  expected to be much  more  extensive  than 
usual  in  August,  while the update a month later, on  15 
August, warned that during the last third of September this 
situation  would  be  even  worse  and  that  the  neighbouring  Vran- 
gel’  massif  would  be  six  times  larger  than  usual.  Short-range 
forecasts  of  ice  conditions  were  generally  extremely  accurate. 
Thus  a  72-hour  forecast  issued  on  2  October  calling  for  a  nar- 
row  shore  lead  to  open  from  Mys  Vankarem  to  Mys  Shelag- 
skiy  during  the  period  3-5  October  and  to  then  close  again  was 
precise;  a  number  of  icebreakers  and  freighters  were  able  to 
take  good  advantage  of it. 
But no matter how accurate these forecasts, the fact re- 
mained that cargoes had to reach their destinations and that 
icebound ships had to be extricated. At the same time the 
forecasts also gave grounds to assume there would be no 
dramatic improvement in conditions before the end of the 
season.  It  was,  no  doubt,  this  realization  that  dictated  the  ma- 
jor decision  to  transfer so many of the country’s icebreaker 
fleet  from  the  western  to  the  eastern  Arctic. 
THE  IMPACT  AT  PEVEK 
The  early  closing  of  other  Chukotka  ports,  such  as  Zelenyy 
Mys  and  Mys  Shmidta,  and  the  consequent  diversion  of  freight 
bound for  those  ports  to  Pevek as the  only  port  left  operating in 
this  part  of  the  Arctic  undoubtedly  placed  a  considerable  strain 
on  Pevek’s  resources.  Even  the  storage of all  the  extra  freight, 
much  of  which  was  foodstuffs  that  could  not  stand  freezing, 
posed problems. The raykom ordered all suitable buildings 
vacated  for  storage  of  the  excess  freigpt  until  the  winter  roads 
to Mys Shmidta, Bilibino and Zelenyy Mys had been estab- 
lished,  probably in  November or December,  when  the  freight 
could be forwarded by truck. At one stage even the Pevek 
sports  arena was  commandeered  (Gorbacheva  and  Zhityakov, 
1983a).  On  21  October  alone  the  port  received  14 OOO tonnes 
of cargo  destined for Mys Shmidta,  Bilibino  and  Zelenyy  Mys, 
all  of  which  had  to  be  stored  (Kurasov,  1983). 
In  contrast  to  this  problem  of  how  to  accommodate  the  sur- 
plus  food,  the  local  rumour-mill  was  predicting  food  shortages 
for  the  town  and  region;  a  rumour  even  began  circulating  to 
the  effect  hat  he  town  was  to  be  evacuated  (Sergeyev, 
1983a).  While  food  supplies  seem  to  have  been  more  than  ade- 
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quate, apparently there was a fuel shortage in Pevek in late 
August and some sort of rationing system was instituted. It 
was  presumably for  this  reason  that so much effort was  later 
expended in escorting  the  tankers Urengoy, Kamensk- 
Ural  ’skiy and Samotlor to this  port. 
Despite the delays and confusion, by late November the 
minister  for  the  Marine  Fleet  was  able  to  make  the  statement 
that “practically all the cargoes”, including building mater- 
ials, equipment, fuel and provisions, had been delivered to 
Chukotka  (Shmyganovskiy , 1983b).  And  on  10  December  his 
ministry received a letter from the Ministry of Commerce 
(Mintorgovli) of  the  Russian  Soviet  Federated  Socialist  Repub- 
lic  expressing  thanks  and  congratulations for having  success- 
fully delivered all the scheduled consumer goods, including 
potatoes,  fresh  fruit  and  vegetables  to  all  points  in  the  eastern 
Arctic (Martyshin, 1983d). 
THE  COST 
This “success” had clearly been achieved at considerable 
cost.  Apart  from  the  loss  of Nina Sagayduk and  the  massive 
damage  to Kolya Myagotin, as  has  already  been  noted,  a  large 
number  of  other  ships  suffered  varying  degrees  and  types  of 
damage.  One  early  report  put  the  number  of  damaged  ships  as 
being  in  excess  of  30  (Bratchikov,  1983).  The  only  consoling 
aspect of  the entire  situation  was  that  there  were  no  lives  lost. 
Perhaps equally costly, but for different reasons, was the 
disruption  caused by the crisis. Presumably  the  transfer  of so 
many  of  the  country’s  most  powerful  icebreakers  from  their 
normal  duties  in  the  western  Arctic  must  have  led  to  postpone- 
ment or cancellation  of  scheduled  activities in the  west. And 
even  more  disruptive  must  have  been  the  re-routing of so many 
ships of the Dal’nevostochnoye Parokhodstvo west to Mur- 
mansk or Arkhangel’sk,  rather  than  back  through  Proliv 
Longa and Bering Strait to their home ports in the Pacific. 
While  in  his  appraisal  of  the  situation  the  deputy  minister  of 
Minmorjlot, A.V. Goldobenko, stressed the importance of 
finding  appropriate  cargoes  for  these  ships  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble  for  the  long  haul  back  from  Arkhangel’sk,  Murmansk or 
the  Baltic  to  Vladivostok,  whether  by  Suez or Panama  (Mar- 
tyshin,  1983d),  inevitably  this  situation  must  have  caused 
severe  disruption  in  scheduled  movements in the  far  east  for 
the  remainder  of  the  winter. 
With regard to the performance of individual ships, the 
nuclear-powered icebreakers (Leonid Brezhnev, Sibir ’ and 
Lenin) received  extremely  high  praise;  Goldobenko  noted  the 
launching  of  a  fourth  nuclear  icebreaker, of comparable  power 
to Leonid Brezhnev and Sibir’, on 2 November 1983 and 
stressed that it was essential to build even more such ships. 
The new Noril’sk (or SA-15) class of icebreaking freighters 
was  also  singled  out  for  particular  praise.  Many of  them  were 
thrown  straight  into  the  fray  in  the  eastern  Arctic  as  soon  as 
they  were  delivered  from  the  Finnish  yards  where  they  were 
built. Capable of tackling ice 1-m thick independently, they 
commonly acted as icebreakers for less powerful ships. The 
ships of this  class  that  played  a  major  role  in  the  crisis  included 
Arkhangel’sk, Bratsk, Igarka, Monchegorsk, Nizhneyansk and 
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Okha. The  successful  performance  of  these  ships  in  the  1983 
crisis unquestionably played a role in the subsequent an- 
nouncement  by  the  Soviet  Union  that  a  further  five  ships  of  the 
class  had  been  ordered  from  the  Finnish  state-owned  Valmet 
shipyard (Lloyds List, 1984).  This  will  bring  the  total  number 
-of these  ships  to  19. 
POST-MORTEM 
In  his  end-of-year  assessment,  Tolstikov  made  the  very  tell- 
ing  point  that  to  send older, less  powerful  freighters  into  heavy 
ice  astern  of  even  the  most  powerful  icebreaker  was  to  court 
disaster  (Tolstikov,  1983).  He  noted  that  both, Nina Sagayduk 
and Kolya  Myagotin (13  and  14  years  old  respectively)  came 
into this category. Bratchikov (1983), a Pravda correspon- 
dent, had earlier made the same point, stressing that there 
were  many  such  ships  on  arctic  service  operated  by  the 
Dal’nevostochnoye  Morskoye  Parokhocistvo; but  he also 
pointed  out  that  since  many  of  the  ports  serviced  by  these  ships 
on  the  north  coast  of  Chukotka  were  either  too  shallow or too 
difficult of access for larger  vessels  such  as  the new Noril’sk 
class  ships  there  was  still  a  need  for  small  ships. 
Bratchikov  also  pointed  out  that  in  terms of organization  of 
arctic  shipping  there  was  a  great  deal of unnecessary  duplica- 
tion  and  confusion  due  to  widespread  overlapping  jurisdictions 
among  ministries.  He  suggested  that  a  “brain centre” was re- 
quired - i.e., an  organization  such  as Glavsevmorput’ (Chief 
Administration of the  Northern  Sea  Route)  had  once  been - 
with a  blanket  responsibility for every  aspect of arctic  ship- 
ping. Glavsevmorput’ was  abolished  in  the  sixties.  There  has 
been  no  official  mention  of  its  possible  resurrection. 
One  area  of  possible  improvement  of  support  services  re- 
commended  by  the  minister  for  the  Marine  Fleet,  Guzhenko 
(Shmyganovskiy,  1983b),  and by his  deputy,  Goldobenko 
(Martyshin, 1983d), was the need for year-round ice recon- 
naissance.  Clearly  this  poses  real  problems  with  regard  to  the 
dark period, but presumably greater use might be made of 
satellite  imagery. 
On  one  topic  almost  every  analyst  was  agreed:  that  much  of 
the  blame  lay  with  the  shippers  of  the  various  cargoes  (Shmy- 
ganovskiy,  1983a,  1983b;  Solov’yev,  1983;  Bratchikov,  1983; 
Martyshin,  1983e).  In many  cases  freight  bound  for  the  Arctic 
reached  the  port  of  departure  extremely  late.  Thus  Goldoben- 
ko  reported  that  whereas  arctic  freight  was  supposed  to  reach 
Vladivostok,  Nakhodka or Vanino  no  later  than  10  August,  the 
last shipment of cement reached Vladivostok at the end of 
August  (Martyshin,  1983d).  In  asimilar  vein  Guzhenko 
(Shmyganovskiy,  1983b)  pointed  out  that  the  last  tanker  had 
left  Nakhodka  for  the  Arctic  on  21  September,  rather  than  its 
scheduled  sailing  date  of  22  August. 
The  analysts  were  equally  unanimous  as  to  the  delays  and 
damage caused by inadequate or inappropriate packaging of 
freight.  Guzhenko  noted  that  only 49 per  cent  of  the  freight  in- 
volved  was  in  containers or acceptable  packaging as specified 
by government  standards  (Shmyganovskiy , 1983b).  This 
meant  that  an  inordinate  amount  of  time was wasted  in  freight 
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handling  and  that  there  was  excessive  spoilage  when  freight 
had to  sit  outdoors  in  the  Arctic. 
The  stated  long-range  goal of MinmorjZot (Armstrong, 
1984)  is  for  year-round  operations  along  the  entire  Northern 
Sea Route, although this goal is not expected to be attained 
before  1990.  When  Guzhenko  was  asked  how  the  problems  of 
the  1983  season in the  eastern  Arctic would  affect  this  long- 
range  goal  (Martyshin,  1983d),  he  still  maintained  that it  could 
be achieved.  However,  he  did  confess  that it  would  take  time, 
money  and  the  application  of  new  technology. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The  1983  crisis  has  clearly  provoked  some  major  changes in 
MinmorjZot’s long-range plans for the Northern Sea Route 
(Shabad,  1984).  Some  of  the  older  smaller  vessels are to be 
retired  from  arctic  service  and  replaced by ships of  the 
Noril’sk (SA-15)  class.  Since  they are too  large  to enter many 
maller  arctic  ports,  the  plan  is  for  them  to  serve  only  two  ma- 
jor ports in  the  eastern  Arctic,  namely  Tiksi  and  Pevek;  the 
freight  will  there  be  transshipped  to  smaller  coastal  vessels  for 
distribution to smaller ports. Pevek is already capable of 
operating as such a break-bulk point, but Tiksi will require 
further  dredging  to  accommodate  the  large  SA-15  ships  at  a 
newly  completed  deepwater pier. 
Another  proposed  strategy  aimed  at  taking  maximum  advan- 
tage of the  short  ice-free  season  is  that  more  ships  will  winter 
in arctic  ports so that  they  can  begin  local  operations as soon  as 
ice  conditions  permit.  But  for  this  strategy  to  be  effective  addi- 
tional  service  facilities,  supplies  and  fuel  will  have  to  be  pro- 
vided  at  arctic  ports  such  as  Pevek  and  Zelenyy  Mys,  where  it 
is  proposed  that  these  ships  will  winter  (Shabad,  1984). 
Several  developments  during  1984  indicate  that  some  reme- 
dial measures have already been put into effect. During the 
very  first  week  of  the  year  the  icebreaker Vladivostok escorted 
the  freighter Kapitan  Markov through  the  ice of  Zaliv  Kresta  to 
the port of Egvekinot (Zzvestiya, 1984a). The first winter 
voyage of Egvekinot had occurred only the previous year, 
when  the  icebreaker Admiral  Makurov (Fig.  16) had  escorted 
Kapitan  Markov’s sister-ship Vasiliy  Fedoseyev into  Egvekinot 
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on 8 February 1983 with a  cargo  of  mining  equipment,  pre- 
fabricated  arctic  houses  and  other  supplies  bound for Iul’tin, 
the  centre  for  a tin  and  tungsten  mining  complex  in  the  interior 
of northern  Chukotka  (Shabad, 1983). 
During  the  post-mortems  over  the crisis in the  eastern  Arctic 
in the  closing  weeks  of 1983 there had  been  several  calls  for 
greater  winter use  of  Egvekinot  and  of  the  winter  road  from 
Iul’tin to Mys Shmidta. Although there has been no official 
confirmation that this was the object of Kupitun Markov’s 
voyage,  it  seems  probable  that  her  cargo may have  contained 
items  bound for Mys  Shmidta as substitutes for items  it  had 
been  impossible  to  deliver  during  the 1983 season. 
Another  theme  to  emerge  from  the  post-mortems  was  that 
greater emphasis should be placed on supplying the eastern 
sector of  the  Arctic  from  the  west. To demonstrate  the 
feasibility  of this, the 1984 summer  shipping  season  was  in- 
augurated by an  unusually  early  voyage by Leonid Brezhnev, 
escorting the Noril ’sk-class freighter Monchegorsk. They 
sailed from Murmansk on 3 June and reached Pevek on 25 
June,  some 40 days  prior  to  the  usual start of operations  at  that 
port  (Shabad, 1984). It  is  interesting  to  note  that Monchegorsk 
(completed  only  in 1983) was  awaiting  repairs at the  Wartsila 
yards in Turku (Finland) in September 1984 (Dr. Brenton 
Barr, pers. comm. 1984). This  would  suggest  that  she  had  not 
emerged  unscathed  from  the  early  through-passage  to  Pevek. 
A final  remedial  measure  that  has  been  attempted  is  the  use 
of the brand-new LASH ship Aleksey Kosygin. Completed 
only  in  December 1983, she  sailed  from  Vladivostok  in  July 
1984 (Pruvda, 1984). She  was  carrying  a  cargo  of 82 loaded 
lighters  stacked  in  six  rows;  the  lighters  can  be  launched  and 
retrieved  from  alongside by a  travelling  gantry crane, which 
can  travel  the  full  length  of  the  ship  from  bridge  to  stern.  She 
was  to deliver  her  lighters  to  a  range of  ports  as  far  north as 
Chukotka. It is  planned  that  hese  will  normally  include 
Egvekinot,  Pevek  and  Zelenyy  Mys,  although  it  is  not  known 
if she  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Kolyma  on  her  maiden  voyage; 
however Zzvestiyu (1984b) indicated  that  she  did  indeed  reach 
Chukotka. The rationale behind the use of this innovative 
vessel  is  that  while Aleksey  Kosygin is  capable  of  tackling  ice 
conditions likely to arise at sea, by offloading her lighters 
while  lying  off  smaller ports (or  even  settlements  without  har- 
bours)  she can service  almost any port on  the  arctic  littoral. 
This is perhaps the most interesting of the innovations to 
emerge  from  the 1983 crisis. 
APPENDIX:  Technical Specifications of the Ships Involved 
ICEBREAKERS 
A. Nuclear-powered 
Leonid Brezhnev Baltiyskiy, 
(formerly Ankika) Leningrad 




B. Conventionally  powered 
Ye- Oy Wiirtsilii A B ,  
Helsinki 
Mral Makarov Oy W-iP A/B, 
Helsinki 
Kmsin Oy Wiirtsilii A/B, 
Helsinki 
Leningmd Oy Wiirtsilii A B ,  
Helsinki 


























3018 147.99 x 30.00 
3018 147.99 x 30.00 
2820 134.02 x 27.64 
- 135.01 x 26.07 
- 135.01 x 26.07 
- 135.01 x 26.07 
1142 122.23 x 24.59 
1142 122.23 x 24.59 
2 reactors, 4 Kirov 
steam turbines (75 OOo 
hp), 3 generators, 
38hafts 
2 readers, 4 Kirov 
steam turbii, (75 ooo 
hp), 3 generators, 
3 shafts 
3 reactors. 4 steam 
turbines (44 OOO hp), 4 
generators, 3 shafts 
9 x 12 cyl. w w i /  
Sulzer diesels (41 400 
hP), 9 g-m, 
3shafts 
9 x 12 cyl. W m P /  
Sulzer diesels (41 400 
hp), 9 generators, 
3 shafts 
9 x 12 cyl. Whi l i i /  
Sulzer diesels (41 400 
hp), 9 generators, 
3 shafts 
8 x 9 cyl. diesels 
(26 OOO hp), 8 
generators, 4 elec. 
motors, 3 shafts 
8 x 9 cyl. diesels 
(26 OOO hp), 8 
generators, 4 elec. 
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Vladiwstok 
Kapitan  Sorokin 
Kapitan  Nikokzyev 
Kapitan  Dmnitsyn 





Oy Wilrtsilll A B ,  
Helsinki 
Oy Wilrtsili4 A I B ,  
Helsinki 
Oy Wllrtsill AB,  
Helsinki 
Oy Wilrtsili AB, 
Helsinki 
































122.23 x 24.59 
131.88 x 26.70 
131.88 x 26.70 
131.88 x 26.70 
131.88 x 26.70 
88.6 x 21.2 
88.6 x 21.2 
68.48 x 18.09 
68.48 x 18.09 
8 x 9  cyl. diesels 
(26 0 hp). 8 
generators,  4  elec. 
mOtOrs,3shafts 
6 x 9  cyl. WilrtsUl 
Sulzer  diesels  (22 OOO 
hp). 6  generators,  3 
elec. motors, 3 shafts 
6 x 9  cyl. WilrtsilHl 
Sulzer diesels  (22 OOO 
hp), 6  generators,  3 
elec. motors, 3 shafts 
6 x 9  cyl. Wilrtsilril 
Sulzer diesels (22 OOO 
hp), 6 generators, 3 
elec. motors, 3 shafts 
6 x 9  cyl. WilrtsilHl 
Sulzer diesels (22 OOO 
hp), 6  generators,  3 
elec. motors, 3 shafts 
4 WiirtsilliNasa 
diesels (12 400 hp), 
2shafts 
4 WiirtsiliiNasa 
diesels  (12 400 hp), 
2 shafts 
3  diesels (5400 hp), 
3  generators,  3 shafts 


































Kapitan  Gotskiy Leninskogo 
Vankarem Leninskogo 
Kapitan Markov hninSkOg0 
Vasiliy Fedoseyev Lel l iMkOgO 


































- 176.9 x 24.5 
- 176.9 x 24.5 
- 176.9 x 24.5 
- 176.9 x 24.5 
- 176.9 x 24.5 
3477  133.1 x 18.9 
3477  133.1 x 18.9 
3477  133.1 x 18.9 
3477  133.1 x 18.9 
3477  133.1 x 18.9 
3477 133.1 x 18.9 
2 Wansila Sulzer, 14ZV 
40148 diesels 
2 W b i l i l  Sulzer, 14ZV 
40148 diesels 
2 W b i l i i  Sulzer, 14ZV 
40148  diesels 
2 Wiirtsilii Sulzer, 14ZV 
40148  diesels 
2 Wiirtsilll Sulzer, 14ZV 
40148  diesels 
4 x 10  cyl.  diesels 
(7200 hp), 4  generators, 
4  elec. motors 
(7200 hp). 4  generators, 
4 elec. motors 
( 7 2 0 0  hp), 4  generators, 
4  elec. motors 
4 x 10  cyl.  diesels 
(7200 hp), 4  generators, 
4  elec. motors 
4 x 10 cyl. diesels 
(7200 hp), 4  generators, 
4 elec. motors 
4 x 10 cyl. b l s  
4 x 10  cyl.  diesels 
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Khudothnik S. Gemsimov 
Galpa Konrlcvcr 











y6?Vgt?Pliiy C h a p l a n O V  
VYborg, 
VYbOrs 






































Santierul  Naval, 
Galatz 























































341  1 
341  1 
341  1 
341  1 
341  1 


















163  1 
163  1 
1631 
1631 








130.31 x 17.02 
130.31 x 17.02 
130.31 x 17.02 
130.31 x 17.02 
123.53 x 15.02 
123.53 x 15.02 
123.53 x 15.02 
123.53 x 15.02 
13o.w x 16.87 
105.7 x 15.65 
105.7 x 15.65 
105.7 x 15.65 
105.7 x 15.65 
105.7 x 15.65 
105.7 x 15.65 
150.27 x 21.06 
150.27 x 21.06 
150.27 x 21.06 
m a a  X 16.74 
123.88 X 16.74 
104.5 x 14.41 
104.5 x 14.41 
Sulzer 5 cyl.  Bransk 
(5500 hp) 
Sulzer 5 cyl.  Bransk 
(5500 hP) 
Sulzer 5 cyl.  Bransk 
(5500 hp) 
Sulzer 5 cyl. Bransk 
(5500 hp) 
2 X a cyl. R U S S ~ ~ Y  
(2000 hp), 2 shafts 
2 X a cyl. R U S S ~ ~ Y  
(2000 hp), 2 shafts 
2 X a C ~ I .  R U S S ~ ~ Y  
(2000  hp),  2 shafts 
2 X a VI. RUSSL~Y 
(2000  hp),  2 shafts 
4 x 10 cyl. diesels 
(7200  hp),  4  generators, 
4 el=. motors 
MAN  6  cyl.  Halberstadt 
MAN  6  cyl.  Halberstadt 
MAN  6  cyl. Hal- 
MAN  6  cyl.  Halberstadt 
MAN  6 cyl. Halberstadt 
MAN  6  cyl.  Halberstadt 
Sulzer  6  cyl.  Cegielskiy 
Sulzer 6  cyl.  Cegielskiy 
Sulzer 6  cyl.  Cegielskiy 
5 cyl. Sulzer (4500  hp) 
5 cyl.  (5450  hp) 
BBtW5cyI.Bransk 
B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk 
(2900  ho) 
(3250  hp) 
(3250 h ~ )  
(3250 h ~ )  
(3250 h ~ )  
(3250 h ~ )  




























Samotlor Rauman Telakka  1975 14500 12  1% 
Rauman-Repola ON, 
Rauma 
UmEW Rauman Telakka  1975 14500 12  1% 
Rauman-Repola ON, 
Rauma 
Berezow Rauman Telakka  1976 14500 12  1% 
Rauman-Repola ON, 
Rauma 
Nihevurtovsk Rauman Telakka  1976 14500 12  1% 
Rauman-Repola ON, 
Rauma 
6639  160.00 x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 0 hP) 
6639  160.00 x 23.07 B & W 5 cyl. Bransk 16.25 
(11 oo0 hp) 
6639  160.00 x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 000 hP) 
6639  160.00 x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 oo0 hp) 
(continued) 
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APPENDIX: Technical  Specifications of the  Ships  Involved  (concluded) 
Date Tonnage  Dimensions s e  
Name  Where  built  completed  dwt. gross, net  (m)  Engines (knots) 
Usinsk Rauman Telakka  1976 14 500 12  1%
Rauman-Repola O N ,  
Rauma 





Igrim Rauman Telakka  1978 14 500 12  1% 
Rauman-Repola ON, 
Rauma 
Yenisepk RaumanTe&‘  1977 14 500 12  1% 
6639  160.00  x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 oo0 hp) 
6639  160.00 x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 mo hp) 
6639  160.00  x 23.07 B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 oo0 hP) 
6639  160.00  x 23.07  B & W 5 cyl.  Bransk  16.25 
(11 mo hP) 
Sources: Bock and Bock,  1977; Curtis and Greenway,  1981. 
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